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Abstract. Th is paper examines the connections between triadism and processuality 
in Peirce’s semiotics by comparing two reducibility theses. Peirce’s thesis regarding 
the irreducibility of triads and its corollary in semiotics, the irreducibility of signs, is 
compared with the process metaphysical thesis regarding the irreducibility of processes. 
Th e comparison indicates that (1) there is a connection between the irreducibility 
of signs and the irreducibility of processes; (2) that the triadic condition of the sign 
entails process metaphysical commitments; and this in turn (3) urges us to consider 
the ontology of the sign from a process metaphysical perspective.
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1. Introduction
In this short paper I examine the connections between triadism and processuality 
in Peircean semiotics by comparing two reducibility theses. I compare Charles 
Peirce’s thesis regarding the irreducibility of triads and its corollary in semiotics, the 
irreducibility of signs, with the process metaphysical thesis regarding the irreducibility 
of processes. Th e comparison indicates that there is a connection between the 
irreducibility of signs and the irreducibility of processes, that the triadic condition of 
the sign entails process metaphysical commitments, and that this in turn urges us to 
consider the ontology of the sign from a process metaphysical perspective. 
2. Triadism and the irreducibility of triads 
Peirce’s philosophy is marked by a tendency to divide everything into threes. Th is 
tendency has been given various names in the literature such as “triadism” (see Burch 
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2014, Section 9)1 and “triadomania” (see Spinks 1991). Even Peirce himself was aware 
of his habit and referred to it as “triadomany” – insisting that he only adheres to it for 
“truth’s sake” (CP 1.568 in Bergman, Paavola 2015).2 According to Robert Burch, Peirce 
scholars still have but a hunch as to what the actual rationale for Peirce’s triadism is. 
Burch speculates that Peirce’s triadism may have originated from his logic-derived 
doctrine of categories, the infl uence of the philosophies of Hegel and Kant, or from 
the “triune commitments of orthodox christianity” (Burch 2014, Section 9). Whatever 
the actual reason might be, it is eminently clear that triadism plays an important 
role in Peirce’s philosophy. Regardless of these diff erent perspectives on triadism, in 
contemporary works dealing with Peirce’s philosophy and semiotics the category-
approach is favoured and triadism is usually linked with the doctrine of categories 
and its logico-mathematical origins. It is not, however, triadism as a tendency that 
is interesting. Instead, it is the idea related to it, concerning the fundamental and 
irreducible nature of triads that is most intriguing.
Peirce discusses the fundamental and irreducible nature of triads in his “A guess 
at the riddle” in which he defends his three categories. While discussing the nature 
of thirds Peirce writes:
But it will be asked, why stop at three? Why not go on to fi nd a new conception, in 
Four, Five, and so on indefi nitely? Th e reason is that while it is impossible to form 
a genuine three by any modifi cation of the pair, without introducing something of 
a diff erent nature from the unit and the pair, four, fi ve and every higher number 
can be formed by mere complications of threes. […] Th e fact that A presents B 
with a gift  C, is a triple relation, and as such cannot possibly be resolved into any 
combination of dual relations. Indeed, the very idea of a combination involves 
that of thirdness, for a combination is something which is what it is owing to the 
parts which it brings into mutual relationship. (Peirce 1991: 192)
Peirce has also expressed a similar point elsewhere as follows: 
[E]very polyad higher than a triad can be analyzed into triads, though not every 
triad can be analyzed into dyads. (MS 439, 16, quoted in Roberts 1973: 115)
Th ese passages bring out the fundamentality of triads and express what some have 
called “the irreducibility of triads” (Roberts 1973: 115), “the irreducibility claim” 
1  Burch, Robert 2014. Charles Sanders Peirce. In: Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), Th e Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition) retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2014/entries/peirce/. 
2 Bergman, Mats; Paavola, Sami 2015. Triadomany. In: Bergman, Mats; Paavola, Sami (eds.), 
Th e Commens Dictionary: Peirce’s Terms in His Own Words. (New ed.) Retrieved from http://
www.commens.org/dictionary/term/triadomany, 15.10.2015.
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(Brunning 1997: 252), or “Peirce’s reduction thesis” (Burch 2014, Section 14; Burch 
1997). Th e irreducibility of triads is not a trivial idea, since it has been proved as 
correct (see Burch 1997) and because it was used by Peirce to justify his category of 
thirdness (Brunning 1997: 252). Th e thesis is also relevant for semeiotics due to the 
interrelated or inseparable nature of Peirce’s logic and semeiotics (see Bellucci 2014). 
Th e central idea in Peirce’s thesis is that triads (in their genuine, non-degenerate form) 
are something fundamental, since they can neither be reduced to dyadic relations 
nor built from monadic or dyadic relations (cf. Burch 2014, Section 14); moreover, 
all relations of a higher arity than three can be constructed from triads. Th is idea, 
specifi cally the part regarding the irreducibility of triads, is interesting when examined 
in the context of Peirce’s semiotics due to the implications it has on the nature of the 
sign and its ontology.
Indeed, the logico-mathematical idea regarding the irreducibility of triads is 
connected with the irreducibility of signs in semeiotics through Peirce’s theory of 
categories, specifi cally through the category of thirdness. As Peirce writes in his letters 
to Lady Welby that “[i]n its genuine form, Th irdness is the triadic relation existing 
between a sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as 
constituting the mode of being of a sign” (CP 8.332 as quoted in Pietarinen 2006: 
18). Th us the triadic sign relation, in its non-degenerate form, exemplifi es genuine 
thirdness and as such should also be considered as irreducible. Th us what holds for 
genuine triads and triadic relations, holds for genuine or non-degenerate signs. Th is is 
not, however, anything new. Remarking on the connection between Peirce’s semeiotics 
and phenomenology, Mats Bergman writes that:
Th e simplest way to describe what distinguishes semeiotic from other major 
variants of semiotics is to say that it is based on the premise that the sign relation 
is irreducibly triadic. [...] Th e claim that semeiotic depends on the theory of 
categories is almost as self-evident, for Peirce singles out the conceptions of sign, 
representation, and medium as prime exemplars of thirdness (see, e.g. CP 1:337, c. 
1875; 1.532, 1903; 1. 537, 1903). (Bergman 2009: 67)
He also points out that:
Th e sign relation is decidedly akin to giving; as noted, Peirce portrays the basic 
semiotic relation as an irreducible triad that can be articulated schematically as 
‘— represents — to —’ or as ‘— mediates between — and —’. Th is suggests that 
the conception of the generic sign relation may be obtained by moving from 
mathematics to grammar via phenomenology, where the role of the latter is to 
detect the appearance of certain triadic phenomena – signs, representations, or 
mediums – that conform to the mathematical categories. (Bergman  2009: 74)
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Th e irreducible nature of the sign has also been seen as constituting one of the four 
conditions of signhood. According to Liszka, we can distinguish four formal conditions 
of signs, the fourth of which he calls the “triadic condition” of the sign (Lizska 1996: 
19). He formulates this condition as follows:
Th e relation among sign (in regard to its ground), object and interpretant must 
be triadic, that is, thought of as an irreducible interrelation through which 
each component gets its sense (CP 5.484), so that the sign’s power to represent 
is mediated by its grounding and interpretation and, similarly, for each of the 
other components. […] Th us grounding, representation, and interpretation are 
triadically interdependent. So, in its most general and fullest terms, a sign must 
represent something in some respect to some interpreter in order to count as a 
sign (CP. 2.228). (Liszka 1996: 19) 
As this triadic condition of the sign requires, a sign in its non-degenerate form must 
be understood as a triadic unity (a genuine triadic relation) that cannot be reduced 
to dyadic relations between its elements. Peirce also discussed the irreducible nature 
of triadic signs in connection with the action of signs that he called semiosis. Peirce 
defi ned semiosis as “an action, or infl uence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of 
three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative infl uence 
not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs” (EP 2.411). Th e sign, 
apart from being a genuine and irreducible triadic relation, must thus also be seen 
as a functional unity, that is, as an action or a process. And according to Liszka, it is 
exactly the triadic condition of the sign that explains semiosis, the functional character 
of the sign (Liszka 1996: 32). 
It is this connection between triadism and the processual nature of the sign that 
is most curious. Triadism, the fundamentality of triads, and the idea regarding their 
irreducibility, leads us to consider the non-degenerate sign as a functional triadic 
unity. If the elements of the sign are irreducibly interrelated, as the triadic condition 
of the sign requires, and a sign must be seen as a kind of action, then the best way 
to characterize a sign would be to call it a triadic process. Moreover, if such triadic 
sign processes are irreducible, then we somehow have to take them as they are. Th is, 
however, leads to interesting process metaphysical commitments regarding the 
ontology of the sign. In order to illustrate this connection further, let us examine a 
thesis similar to the irreducibility of triads.
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3. The irreducibility of processes
Th e “process reducibility thesis” is a metaphysical thesis regarding the nature of 
processes. Th is thesis claims that all processes are subordinate to substantial things 
and that the activity of these things is what constitutes a process (Rescher 1996: 43–44). 
Th e thesis further claims that “[t]here just are no processes apart from those that 
constitute the activity of identifi able agents. All process is reducible to the doings of 
(nonprocessual) things” (Rescher 1996: 44). Th e thesis has two parts: the giving of 
primacy and priority to things. Giving priority to things means that “[...] the only sort 
of processes there are are those involved in the doings and comportments of things” 
(Rescher 1996: 2), that is, all processes are made up of the action of things. And giving 
primacy to things means that things are all there is (Rescher 1996: 2). Th e process 
reducibility thesis thus claims that processes consist primarily of things and the actions 
of things (Rescher 1996: 2, 42–43). From this perspective reality is best understood 
in terms of things, and all processes must, in principles, be reducible to the action of 
things. Th is position is, however, incompatible with the Peircean conception of the 
sign as a genuine and irreducible triadic relation, since adopting such a perspective 
would require that non-degenerate signs can somehow be reducible.
Th e “process reducibility thesis” is a starting point for process metaphysics as it 
is this thesis that it opposes (Rescher 1996: 43). According Nicholas Rescher (1996: 
44), process metaphysics instead claims that “[...] things are constituted out of the 
fl ow of process, and substantiality is subordinate to activity. Th ings simply are what 
they do”. Process metaphysics can be formulated in terms of an opposing thesis that 
could called the irreducibility of processes thesis. Th is thesis would also have two parts: 
the giving of primacy and priority to processes. Giving primacy to processes would 
mean that “[s]ubstance is subordinate to process: things are simply constellations 
of processes” (Rescher 1996: 2). And giving priority to a processes would mean that 
“[t]hings are always subordinate to processes because processes inwardly engender, 
determine, and characterize the things there are” (Rescher 1996: 2). It is therefore 
clear that process metaphysics, or at least those committed to process metaphysics 
and the irreducibility of processes thesis, holds that true processes cannot be seen as 
or reducible to the activity of things. Process metaphysics thus allows the existence of 
irreducible processes and in this respect it also provides a better ontological framework 
for the sign as an irreducible triadic process than orthodox substance ontology.
Rescher also makes a distinction between owned and unowned processes. He 
defi nes the two types of processes in the following way:
Owned processes are those that represent the activity of agents [...]. Such processes 
are ownership attributable with respect to “substantial items”. Unowned processes, 
by contrast, are free fl oating, as it were, and do not represent the activity of actual 
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(i.e., more than nominal) agents [...]. From the process philosopher’s point of view, 
the existence of unowned processes is particularly important because it shows that 
the realm of process as a whole is something additional to and separable from the 
real of substantial things. (Rescher 1996: 42)
As pointed out before, the sign, in its non-degenerate form, is a true triadic relation 
and thus it is something irreducible. Following the above-cited distinction, signs could 
further be classifi ed as unowned processes, as “something additional to and separable 
from the real of substantial things” (Rescher 1996: 42). And this in turn would make 
the sign a true process.
As the considerations above indicate, there is a curious connection between the 
irreducibility of signs and the irreducibility of processes. Th e triadic condition of the 
sign entails process metaphysical commitments for semiotics regarding the ontology 
of the sign, because it requires that signs are genuinely triadic and thus irreducible. 
Th e most important of these commitments is, however, the idea that both the sign 
and its ontology should be seen in processual terms. Th is in turn brings triadism 
and processuality in connection with each other. Let us now move on to discuss the 
relationship between the two irreducibility theses as introduced above.
4. Irreducibility theses in comparison
Th e irreducibility of triads thesis and its equivalent (or corollary) in the theory of signs, 
the triadic condition of the sign, is similar to the irreducibility of processes thesis in 
process metaphysics. Both claim that their object of interest (signs as triadic relations 
and processes as such) cannot be reduced to the action of their parts or seen as the 
action of things, but instead should be taken as they are. 
Triadism holds that triads are fundamental, since they cannot be constructed 
out of or reduced to monads or dyads, and that more complex relations can be 
reduced to or constructed out of triads. In the context of the theory of signs this 
translates into a processual conception of the sign as an irreducible functioning 
triadic unity. Processualism similarly holds that processes cannot be reduced to the 
doings of things and this is why processes should be given primacy or priority in 
ontology. Processualism, however, comes in two diff erent variants. If triadism entails 
processuality, then the question is what kind of processualism does it entail? 
Rescher makes a distinction between ontological and conceptual process 
metaphysics. He defi nes the two in the following way:
Th e conceptual aspect is based on the idea that process and its ramifi cations aff ords 
the most appropriate and eff ective conceptual instruments for understanding the 
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world we live in. And the ontological aspect inheres in the idea that this conceptual 
state of aff airs obtain because process is the most pervasive, characteristic, and 
crucial feature of reality. Th is duality of doctrinal perspective leads to there being 
two distinct (albeit compatible) versions of process philosophy. In its stronger 
version, process philosophy is an ontological  reductionism that sees all physical 
things as reducible to physical processes. In its weaker version, process philosophy 
is a conceptual reductionism that sees the explanation of the idea of a “thing” as 
necessarily involving a recourse to processual ideas. (Rescher 1996, 28)
Following Rescher, we might say that triadism entails a conceptual processualism 
that requires recourse to processual ideas in order to make sense of the sign and its 
irreducibility. Th e triadism-processuality connection also raises other questions. If 
triadism somehow causes processuality, must all genuine processes be triadic? For 
it might be true that all triads are processes, but all processes are not triads. And if 
triadism is linked with processuality, must all semiotic processes be triads? Whatever, 
the answer to these open questions might be, it seems that there is a similarity between 
the irreducibility of triads, its semiotic corollary, and the irreducibility of processes. 
Moreover, it is this similarity that seems to have interesting implications for the sign 
and its ontology. At the very least, it urges us to reconsider the ontology of the sign 
from a process metaphysical perspective.3
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Триадичность и процессуальность
В статье исследуются связи между триадичностью и процессуальностью в семиотике 
Пирса, сравниваются два тезиса о редуцируемости (reducibility). Тезис Пирса о 
нередуцируемости триад и его расширение в семиотике – нередуцируемость знаков – 
сравнивается с метафизическим тезисом о нередуцируемости процессов. Сравнение 
показывает: (1) что есть связь между нередуцируемостью знаков и нередуцируемостью 
процессов, (2) что триадическая сущность знака влечет за собой процесс метафизических 
обязательств, и это в свою очередь (3) побуждает нас рассматривать онтологию знака в 
процессе метафизической перспективы.
Triaadilisus ja protsessuaalsus
Artiklis vaadeldakse triaadilisuse ja protsessuaalsuse seoseid Peirce’i semiootikas, võrreldes 
kahte taandatavuse kohta käivat teesi. Peirce’i teesi kolmikute taandamatuse kohta ning 
selle tuletust semiootikas, et märgid on redutseerimatud, võrreldakse protsessimetafüüsilise 
teesiga protsesside taandamatuse kohta. See võrdlus osutab, et (1) on olemas seos märkide 
taandamatuse ja protsesside taandamatuse vahel, (2) et märgi kolmetise oluga kaasnevad 
protsessimetafüüsilised järelmid ja see omakorda (3) õhutab meid vaatlema märgi ontoloogiat 
protsessimetafüüsilisest perspektiivist.
